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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE PRIDE CLUB, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.

12066

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants' Statement of the Nature of the Case, Disposition in the Lower Court, and Statement of Facts correctly sets forth those matters.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek affirmance of the summary
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County in
favor of Respondents.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
APPELLANTS HA VE NO STANDING AND
ARE IN NO POSITION TO RAISE THE QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION"S 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5, U. C. A. 1953
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 16-613.7, U. C. A.
1953.
Under this Point I we are answering appellant's Point

III.
(a) The first two numbered sections require consent
of the local authority to obtain a license from the Liquor
Control Commission to operate a liquor store in a social
club. Appellants assert that these sections of the statutes
are unconstitutional because they contain no standards,
limitations or guide lines for the local authority to follow
and thus permits arbitrary and discriminatory action on
the part of the local authority.
We must emphasize that this case involves the control
and regulation of the sale and consumption of liquor, a
business which no one has an inherent right to conduct and
one that is subject to strict regulation, and even prohibition, by the state. This factor must not be lost sight of in
the proper disposition of this appeal as will be abundantly
shown by the authorities which we will cite.
The foregoing heading to this part of the brief could
very well be stated in the words of this Court in State v.
Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414, wherein this Court
stated:
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This court will not listen to an objection made
as to the constitutionality of an act by parties whose
rights are not specifically affected. This court is
committed to the rule that an attack on the validity
of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests have not been and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute. State ex rel.
Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. 2d 408;
Utah Mfrs ...Assn. v. Stewart, etc., et al., 82 Utah
198, 23 P. 2d 229.
There are no allegations that appellants have applied
for and been denied the consent of any local authority. They
simply say that if and when they do apply it is within the
power of a local authority to deny or grant consent arbitrarily and discriminatorily. As will be shown, this is not
a sufficient basis for questioning the constitutionality of
the statutes here involved.
In Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, supra, this Court ruled
on a challenge to the state liquor laws and stated as follows:
Plaintiff contends the law is unreasonable and
discriminatory. If this is true, we do not see how
plaintiff can lawfulJy complain ... since there is no
discrimination against it or other manufacturers
who use alcohol.
This case is cited with approval in Phi Kappa Iota
Fraternity, et al. v. Salt Lake Cdy, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.
2d 177, which holds in effect that one whose interests are
not adversely affected by legislation may not raise the
question of its constitutionality.
In 2 A. L. R. 2d, p. 917, it is said: "It is settled that
the validity of a statute or ordinance is open to attack only
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by a person or organization whose rights are injuriously
affected thereby."
To same effect, see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497; Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 487; Delaware Valley Conservation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F. 2d 331.
3 McQuillin, Sec. 12.126, p. 526 :

It is presumed that they (public officers) will
properly discharge the duties of their office, and in
the absence of proof to the contrary, they will be
presumed to have acted in the exercise of their powers in the interest of the public and within the
authority granted.
A leading case on the subject under discussion is
People ex rel. Liberman V. Vein De Carr, 175 N. Y. 440, 67
N. E. 913. The decision of the New York court was
affirmed in People ex rel. Liberman v. Van De Carr,
199 U. S. 552, where defendant was convicted of selling milk without a permit. The ordinance of New
York City provided that, "No milk shall be received,
held, kept, offered for sale or delivery in the city of New
York without a permit in writing from the Board of Health
and subject to the conditions thereof." Defendant contended
this ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. He appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States contending the language of the ordinance vests arbitrary and absolute power in the Board
of Health without declaring any lines or limits for the exercise of its prohibitive action and allows the board to load
its permits with conditions the nature of which is not indicated or limited. Defendant relied on Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
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118 U. S. 356. The Supreme Court sustained the conviction
and said:
These cases leave in no doubt the proposition
that the conferring of discretionary power upon administrative boards to grant or withhold permission
to carry on a trade or business which is the proper
subject of regulation within the police power of the
state is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.
There is no presumption that the power will be arbitrarily exercised, and when it is shown to he thus
exercised against the individual, under sanction of
state authority, this court has not hesitated to interfere for his protection, when the case has come
before it in such manner as to authorize the interference of a federal court. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
u. s. 356.
We have then an ordinance which, as construed
by the highest court of the state, authorizes the
exercise of a legal discretion in the granting or
withholding of permits to transact a business which,
unless controlled, may be highly dangerous to the
health of the community, and no affirmative showing that the power has been exerted in so arbitrary
and repressive manner as to deprive the appellant
of his property or liberty without due process of
law. In such cases, it is the settled doctrine of this
court that no federal right is invaded, and no authority exists for declaring a law unconstitutional
duly passed by the legislative authority and approved by the highest court of the state.
The granting of the authority to grant or withhold a
permit in such a case involving a state regulated business
under the police powers was held by both the New York
court and the Supreme Court to carry with it the implied
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restriction that it will be exercised lawfully and thus the
question of constitutionality was eliminated.
In Ex Parte Porterfield, 63 Ca1. 2d 524, 147 P. 2d 20,
the court says :
In California the presumption that licensing
boards or officers will act fairly and impartially in
the performance of their lawful duty is in accordance with the federal rule in that regard. A grant
of authority to a municipality carries with it the
presumption that the council will perform its duty
lawfully without discrimination.
The court quotes from 19 Cal. Law Review as follows:
The California case under discussion fortifies
previous holdings in this state, and is in accord with
the federal rule, that a grant of authority carries
the implication that it will be exercised reasonably,
fairly and lawfully. See People ex rel. Liberman v.
Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 522, 26 S. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed.
305; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216
U. S. 177, 305 S. Ct. 356, 54 L. Ed. 435; Hall v.
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217, 61 L.
Ed. 480; Ex Parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 90 P.
702. The court expressly declares that, "the statute
will be construed together with the constitutional
provisions against discrimination." People v. Globe
Train and Milling Co., 221 Cal. 121, 294 P. at page

5.

But in jurisdictions like California where such
enactments are upheld through reading in constitutional limitations a complainant may only have relief under the statute by proving discrimination
against himself. In the instant case, the plaintiff
sets up no facts proving discrimination, but alleges
that since the statute, on its face, did not prevent
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unfair action it was invalid . . . The case seems
rather to be decided upon the sensible theory that
administrative officers are sufficiently limited by
reading into their authority constitutional limitations, and in proper cases an adequate remedy
against the misuse of discretion is provided by a
review of their orders and rules.
Under the preceding authorities, in the absence
of evidence of an abuse of discretion, it will not be
presumed the ordinance is void, merely because the
statutory authority to enact ordinances for "regulation and revenue" does not prescribe limitations of
discretion on the part of the council.

Mosher v. Beirne, 377 F. 2d 638:
It has also been recognized that the conferring
of discretionary power upon administrative boards
to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade
or business which is the proper subject of regulation within the police power of the state is not violative of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. People ex rel. Liberma,n v. Van De Carr, 199
U. S. 552, 26 S. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 305, and that
ordinances validly prohibiting the operation of certain businesses without first obtaining municipal
permission do not deprive one of his property without due process of law nor deny one the equal protection of the law. Fincher v. City of St. Louis, 194
U. S. 361, 24 S. Ct. 673, 48 L. Ed. 1018.

In 31 C. J. S., sec. 146, p. 329, is the following:
It is also presumed as an element of the general rule, that a public officer, in the discharge of
his official duties, whether or not an oath has been
required, acts fairly, impartially, and in good faith,
and in the exercise of a sound judgment and discr~-
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tion, for the purpose of promoting the public good
and protecting the public interest.
In 12 A. L. R., p. 1435, is the following:
It should also be remembered that the fact that
a court has laid down one rule in one case, as, for
instance, that a municipal ordinance granting arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion to city officers as
to the granting of licenses or permits to carry on
what is generally regarded as a useful and ordinarily lawful business does not necessarily preclude the
reaching of a contrary conclusion as to the validity
of a grant of power with respect to the licensing of
a business such as dealing in intoxicating liquors,
the right to carry on which is generally regarded as
a mere privilege, subject to arbitrary control or absolute prohibition.
On page 1447, the note states:

It is also well settled that it is not ahvays necessary that statutes and ordinances prescribe a specific rule of action, but, on the other hand, some
situations require the vesting of some discretion in
public officials, as for instance, where it is difficult
or impracticable to lay down a definite, comprehensive rule, or the discretion relates to the admin-

istration of a police regulation and is necessary to
protect the public morals, health, safety and general
welfare. Citing the Liberrna.n case.

This annotation is continued in 54 A. L. R. 1164 and
92 A. L. R. 400. In the latter it is said, p. 410 :
It may be noted that the modern tendency is to
be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to
administrative bodies or officers in order to facilitate the administration of laws as the complexity of
economic and governmental conditions increase.
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The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkin.~, 118 U. S. 356, cited
by appellants is not in point. There the petitioner had been
denied a license to engage in the laundry business simply
because he was Chinese. There was an actual invasion of
of his right to carry on a lawful business. In Kotch v.
River Port Pilot Comrs., 330 U. S. 557, 90 L. Ed. 1093, the
court said that Yick Wo "was denied the right (to conduct
his laundry business) solely because he was Chinese."
All that can be said of appellant's position is that at
some time in the future some one or more of them may be
injured by a discriminatory action by a municipality refusing to give its consent. This is to presume that the municipality will act discriminatorily or arbitrarily, a presumption which the authorities above cited hold may not be indulged in.
None of the appellants before this court has a lawful
complaint. None of them has been denied local consent.
Under the authorities above cited the duty to exercise a
reasonable discretion and sound judgment in determining
whether to grant or withhold consent is to be read into the
statute as part thereof and consequently no constitutional
question arises. One who deems himself discriminated
against may have a court determine if such discrimination
is a fact and so obtain relief against the body withholding
consent. This is what Yick \Vo did and he obtained relief
without striking down the legislative enactment under
which the authority purported to act in denying him his
right to conduct a laundry business.
The case of Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, cited
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by appellants, involved a statute creating the crime of libel.
The court held that the law under which the accused was
convicted was given such a broad construction and was so
vague in providing standards by which a publication should
be determined to be a libel as to make it unconstitutional.
Here was an attempt to define what would be a crime and
punishable as such. The court held the act was too vague
for that purpose. This holding has no bearing on the question before this court. No crime is here involved. The appellants attempt to read into a statute regulating a business
subject to regulation under the police power a rule of law
governing the definition of a crime, something wholly foreign to the question involved. The court also indicated that
the court must look more closely to see "lest under the guise
of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power,
freedom of speech or of the press suffer." The court in
Winters v. New York, 333 N. Y. 507, 68 S. Ct. 65, 82 L. Ed.
840,says:
The standards of certainty in statutes punishing for offenses is higher than in those depending
primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement. The
crime must be defined with appropriate definiteness. There must be ascertainable standards of
guilt.
One of the cases cited by the court in Ashton v. Kentucky, supra, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, clearly shows
the distinction above made. There the court held that
"when a statute, valid on its face, requires the issuance of
a license or certificate to carry on a business or to follow a
vocation one who is within the terms of the statute, but has
failed to make the required application, is not at liberty to
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complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid
action in administration. This principle, however, is not
applicable where a statute is invalid upon its face and an
attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of constitutional rights.

All of the cases cited by the court in Ashton v. Kentucky to support its decision, cited on pages 16 and 17 of
appellant's brief, involve statutes held to be too vague to
justify criminal prosecution for a violation.
The case of Graccio v. State of Penn., 382 U. S. 401,
involved a statute which permitted the jury to impose costs
upon a defendant though found not guilty of the charge on
which he was tried. It fixed no standards to govern the
jury in determining the amount of the costs to be imposed,
but provided for imprisonment of the defendant if he failed
to pay the costs imposed. The court said : "Whatever label
be given the 1860 act, there is no doubt that it provides the
state with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant
of his liberty and property." This element is not involved
in the instant case, first because plaintiffs have no property
right that can be involved under the statute in question
and, second, because the constitutional safeguards are to be
read into said statutes as we have abundantly shown.
The same is true as to the case of Jones v. Logan City,
19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P. 2d 160, cited on page 19 of appellant's brief. We emphasize again that in granting or denying the right to engage in the sale and consumption of liquor
no property rights are involved. To engage in this business
is a privilege which may be granted or withheld. Appel-
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lants seem to argue that the whole liquor control act and
"where liquor may be stored, served, consumed and sold
within the state" are involved in the two statutory provisions under attack. On the contrary, those two sections
concern only a social club having a liquor store on its premises. And only whether a permit for such a store is to be
granted depends upon the consent of the local authority. It
will be presumed that in determining whether to grant or
deny consent the local authority will act reasonably and
fairly in the interests of the public until the contrary is
shown.
(b) Appellants attack Section 16-6-13.7, U. C. A.
1953, as being violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Federal Constitution that people shall
be safe from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The challenged section (which is quoted in appellant's
brief, page 3), provides for inspection of the premises and
books and records of the licensee at any time during transaction of business by any member of the council, the commission or any peace officer or investigator upon presentation of proper credentials.
In Kellaher v. Minshull, 119 P. 2d 302, 11 Wash. 2d
380, the statute governing small loans proYided that the
supervisor may at any time investigate the loans, and business and examine the books, accounts records and files
therein and for that purpose the supervisor and his representatives shall have free access to the offices and places
of business, etc. The court held the Federal Fonrth Amendment was not involved and as to the state constitution
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which provided, "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law",
said:
Constitutional provisions such as those contained in the article and section just quoted are
primarily designed to protect individuals in the
sanctity of their homes and the privacy of their
books and papers and they are not infringed by the
enforcement of reasonable rules which have been
adopted in the exercise of the police power for the
protection of the public health, morals and welfare.
24 R. C. L. 704, Searches and Seizures, Sec. 6; see
also 56 C. J. 1160, Searches and Seizures, Sec. 12.
In Financial Aid Corporation v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114,
23 N. E. 2d 472, the court upheld a similar statute which
subjected the small loan operator to visitation and examination, the court said:
The appellant claims that this provision
amounts to an illegal search and seizure of the appellant's property. Regulatory provisions of this
nature have been recognized so long that it would
be folly to undertake to strike them down at this
time. There is nothing in the act to violate Sec. 11,
Article I of the Indiana Constitution. Sherman v.
City of Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N. E. 560, 11
L. R. A. 318.
It cannot be successfully contended that the act
deprives the appellant of its property without due
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
In the Sherman case it is said that the federal constitutional provision on searches and seizures is "literally copied
into our state constitution."
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In 16 Am. Jur. 2nd, p. 313-314, Sec. 120, it is stated:
It is established that one cannot invoke, in order to defeat a law, an apprehem;ion of what might
be done under it and which, if done, might not receive judicial approval; to complain of a ruling one
must be the victim of it.
In the footnote to this statement is the following:
A defendant who has not been called on to give
evidence against himself and whose person or house
has not been subjected to any search has not the
necessary interest to raise the question whether a
statute under which he is being prosecuted violates
the Bill of Rights with respect to self-incrimination
and unreasonable searches and seizures. State v.
Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317, 69 A. L. R. 574; State
v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. \V. 945.
In State

v. Hill, supra, the court said:

Defendant has not yet been called on to give
evidence against himsel, nor has any attempt been
made to search his person or his house. Hence he
has no interest in raising that question in the present case.
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit the
appellants have no legal basis for their action. They do
not have the standing or interest necessary to question the
validity of the statutory provisions they attack.
POINT II.
SEC. 16-6-13.7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1969) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15
GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE
SAFE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
AND SEIZURES.
In a consideration of the issues involved in this appeal
we remind the court that the Fourth Amendment applies,
by its own terms, only to "unreasonable'' searches and
seizures. This plainly indicates that not all searches and
seizures are outlawed. ·what is reasonable must be decided
in the light of each situation and circumstances and the
purposes to be accomplished in any particular case.

The United States Supreme Court cases cited by
appellant are not in point.
(a)

It is well to examine the facts involved in the two

Supreme Court cases cited by appellants. The first case,
Camara V. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), involved
an ordinance of San Francisco providing for inspection of
apartment houses to be made at least annually for possible
violations of the city's housing codes. The city's inspector
was told by the apartment manager that appellant leased
the ground floor and was using it as a residence, which was
contrary to the city code. The inspector asked permission
to inspect the premises, which request was refused because
of lack of a search warrant. The inspector returned again
two days later, still without a warrant. He was again refused. Some two weeks later two inspectors returned and
informed appellant that he was required by law to permit
inspection, citing the city ordinance requiring inspection
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upon an inspector's showing proper credentials. Appellant
still refused. He was later charged with refusing to permit
inspection in violation of the ordinance. The ordinance
made violation, disobedience or failure to comply with the
provisions of the code a misdemeanor punishable by a fine
not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment not to exceed six
months, or both such fine and imprisonment. He was convicted and his conviction was sustained by the District
Court of Appeals. The case was then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court which overruled the earlier
case of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), which
validated a similar ordinance dealing with inspections by
a health officer with the result that to inspect appellant's
premises a search warrant was held necessary and so the
conviction was nullified.

However, the Supreme Court in Camara did not hold
that a search may not be made without a warrant in all
cases. It carefully pointed out that public interest in other
situations may require that no search warrant be obtained.
It said as to that point:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is
not whether the public interests justifies the type
of search in question, but whether the authority to
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in
turn depends in part upon whether the burden of
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771. It has
nowhere been urged that fire, health and housing
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code inspection programs could not achieve their
goals within the confines of a reasonable search
warrant requirement. Thus we do not find the public need argument dispositive. (Emphasis added.)
It is clear from the facts of the case that the procurement of a search warrant could have been obtained without
in any manner jeopardizing the objective to be obtained by
the search. The Court recognized that there are situations
in which the securing of a search warrant would defeat the
purpose of the search. The cited case of Schmerber involved a liquor law violation. In that case the petitioner
was convicted of drunk driving. He was arrested at the
hospital where he was receiving treatment for injuries suffered in an accident which occurred while he was driving
the automobile involved. A blood sample was taken from
him which showed him to be under the influence of alcohol.
He refused to consent to the taking of the sample and objected to its introduction in evidence. On the question of
the application of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, the Court there said:
The officer, in the present case, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an
emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain
a warrant threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964), 11
L. Ed. 2d 777. We are told that the percentage of
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate
it from the system. Particularly in a case such as
this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to the hospital and to investigate the scene of
the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.
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It is apparent, therefore, that the Camara decision
must be confined to its facts and that it is only authority
against warrantless searches or inspections under municipal fire, health and housing codes. It is not authority insofar as a state's liquor law is concerned. This was expressly
declared in the case of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, -------- U. S. ________ , 90 S. Ct. 77 4, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60,
( 1970. In that case federal agents, acting without
a warrant, inspected the premises of a licensed New
York liquor dealer for possible violations of federal laws,
and, upon the dealer's refusal to unlock a storeroom, broke
the lock and seized bottles of liquor. The dealer instituted
an action to recover the liquor and suppress it as evidence.
The applicable statutes gave the Secretary of the Treasury
or his delegate broad authority to enter and inspect the
premises of retail dealers in liquor. The Court says:
We agree that Congress has broad power to
design such powers of inspection under the liquor
laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand.
The general rule laid down in See v. City of Seattle,
supra, at 545, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 947 - 'that administrative entry, without consent, upon the premises
which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within
the framework of a warrant procedure' - is there! ore not applicable here. In See, we reserved decision on the problems of 'licensing programs' requiring inspection, saying they can be resolved 'on
a case by case basis under the general Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness' . . . .
We deal here with the liquor industry long
subject to close supervision and inspection. As re-
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spects that industry, Congress has broad authority
to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches
and seizures. Under existing statutes, Congress selected a standard that does not include forcible entry
without a warrant. It resolved the issue not by
authorizing forcible, warrantless entries, but by
making it an offense for a licensee to refuse admission to the inspector.
Since forcible entry was not provided by Congress,
only prosecution for failing to permit inspection being provided, the Court in Colonnade held the forcible entry without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The inference is clear, however, that if Congress had provided for
forcible entry such could have been made without a warrant.
Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion would
have allowed the forcible entry absent specific provisions
therefore:
The majority, far from finding this search unreasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth
Amendment, holds only that it was not authorized
by 26 U. S. C., Secs. 5146(b), 1606(a), and that
therefore the liquor must be returned. While these
statutes do not in express terms authorize forcible
breaking and entering to seize liquor kept in violation of federal law, it is perfectly clear that they
do not in express terms declare such seizure illegal,
and in my opinion those provisions impliedly authorize exactly the type of official conduct involved here.
I am confident that when Congress said that federal
liquor agents could search without a warrant and
further provided for fines if the owner refused to
permit such a search, it also intended to authorize
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forcible entry and seizure if that becomes necessary.
The case of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541
( 1967), involved a conviction for refusing to permit a representative of the Seattle Fire Department to enter and
inspect appellant's locked commercial warehouse without
a warrant based on probable cause to believe a violation
of the city ordinance existed therein. Appellant was convicted for refusing entry. The Court there applied to a
business building the rule announced in the Camara case,
supra, as to residential premises.
However, as noted from the excerpt from the Colonnade case, supra, the court eliminates the See case as an
authority in the instant case. In legislation involving liquor,
the state legislature would have the same kind of broad
powers as the Colonnade case ascribes to Congress. As
stated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in that case:
"Surely Congress was not unaware that purveyors of liquor do not leave their wares or stores
or reserve supplies lying casually about; on the contrary they keep supplies under lock in various ways,
including lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms;
this practice is so universal it can be judicially noticed. Likewise it must be conceded that the legislature was aware of the fact that to require a search
warrant after entry was refused would defeat the
whole purpose of the inspection as all unlawful acts
or conditions existing at the time would be abandoned or erased while the warrant was being obtained. As stated in the Camara case, the question,
in determining whether the public interest requires
a warrantless search, ''depends upon whether the
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burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search."
Appellants further rely upon the case of Vagabond
Club v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P. 2d 691
(1968). The decision of the majority in this case relies
upon the Camara and See cases as dispositive of the question of the invasion of the Fourth Amendment by an inspection without a warrant. The Court in Vagabond applied
to a situation involving inspections under the liquor law the
rule those two cases applied to a residence and a business
establishment without any discussion of the difference between the two kinds of inspections and the public interest
to be subserved by such inspections. As we have already
shown, the United States Supreme Court in the Colonnade
cases held the distinction was so substantial that the rule
announced in those cases was not applicable to a case involving inspections in connection with the liquor business
and upheld the statute providing for inspections without
a warrant.
Appellants also cite Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah
2d 112, 466 P. 2d 838 (1970), in which case the majority
of this Court held the city ordinance which provided that,
as to taverns licensed by the city, the "police department
shall be permitted to and have access to all premises licensed or applying for licenses under this chapter, and
shall make periodic inspections of said premises and report
its findings to the board of commissioners", was unconstitutional. This Court there held the decision in the Vagabond case was dispositive of the matter. What we have
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said concerning the Vagabond case applies equally to the
Wheeler case.
The Court made a point of the fact that the inspection
could be made at any time under the ordinance and was
not limited to business hours. It concludes that such inspections unlimited as to time seems "to explode any mythical distinction between 'browsing' inspection and 'bruising'
search, so far as the Fourth Amendment concepts are concerned." The statute attacked in the instant case specifically limits the inspection to times when the establishment
"is open for the transaction of business to its members."
In this important particular the instant case differs from
the Wheeler case.
The Court there asks, "What is wrong or onerous about
requiring a warrant", seemingly ignoring the well-known
fact that all signs of violations could and probably
would be removed during the interim required to se~
cure a warrant. That is the distinguishing fact between inspections under the liquor lavv's and inspections under the
health and fire codes and makes the inspection reasonable.
To require a warrant before inspection would emasculate
the purpose for issuing the warrant. As to this important
element, the Court was silent. To us it is the basic element
that must be considered to properly dispose of the issue involving the Fourth Amendment.
In Hurless v. Department of Liquor Control, 136
N. E. 2d 736 (1965), the statute, G. C. Sec. 606463, authorized an ins11ection or search of the licensed
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premises without a search warrant. As to this statute the
Court says: "The necessity of legislation such as is embodied in G. C. Sec. 6064-63 to the proper enforcement of the
Liquor Control Act is self-evident. Such a provision restricted to the premises of permit holders manifestly does
not contemplate an unreasonable search or seizure." 'l'he
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this decision 164 Ohio St.
492, 132 N. E. 2d 107 (1956).
We wish to emphasize the all important proposition
that the Fourth Amendment is directed only against unreasonable search and seizure. What is unreasonable in one
situation may not be in another. As stated in the Colonnade
case, "In See, we reserved decisions on the problems of
'licensing programs' requiring inspection, saying they can
be resolved on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth
Amendment standard of reasonableness." In this connection we quote what is said and relied upon in the Colonnade
case:
The government, emphasizing that the Fourth
Amendment bars only 'unreasonable searches and
seizures', relies heavily on the long history of the
regulation of the liquor industry during pre-Fourth
Amendment days, first in England and later in the
American colonies. It is pointed out, for example,
that in 1660 the precursor of modern day liquor
legislation was enacted in Eng]and which allowed
commissioners to enter, on demand, brewing houses
at all times for inspection. Massachusetts had a
similar law in 1692. And in 1791, the year in which
the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress imposed an excise tax on imported distilled spirits and
on liquor distilled here, under which law fec1,eral
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officers had broad powers to inspect distilling premises and the premises of importers without a warrant. From these and later laws and regulations
governing the liquor industry, it is argued that Congress has been most solicitous in protecting the
revenue against various types of fraud and to that
end has repeatedly granted federal agents power to
make v arrantless searches and seizures of articles
under the liquor laws.
The Court recognized the special treatment of
inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 29 L. Ed. 746, 748, 6 S.
Ct. 524 ... in the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an inherent interest in
them for the payment of the duties thereon, and
until such duties are paid has a right to pursue and
drag them from concealment ...
As this act was passed by the same Congress
which proposed for adoption the original amendments to the Constitution, it is clear that the members of that body did not regard searches and seizures of this kind as 'unreasonable' and they are
not embraced within the prohibition of the amendment.
We respectfully submit in view of the foregoing that
while the writer of the opinion in the Wheeler case stated
the Colonnade case was no comfort to the city in that case,
the Colonnade case is actually dispositive of the issue now
before the court and upholds the constitutionality of Section 16-6-13.7.

With no provision for criminal prosecution for
refusing entry on request, the statute here invol1,ed is valid.
(b)

There is another important aspect to be considered.
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The Appellants quote only a subdivision of Section 16-613.7 and failed to quote the first part of the section which
begins as follows :
Each applicant for a license under the provisions of this chapter by accepting a license issued
hereunder, or claiming the right under this chapter
to store or permit the consumption of liquor on its
premises, agrees and consents to abide by the following conditions and requirements.
Then follow 19 different conditions and requirements, including the seventh quoted in appellants' brief. Further,
unlike the laws involved in the Camara, See and Colonnade
cases, there is no penalty fixed for refusing entry. The
last sentence of the section provides :
Failure on the part of the licensee, club officers, managing agent, members or employees to
adhere to the above conditions shall constitute
grounds for the suspension or revocation of any
license issued under this chapter.
Section 16-6-13.11 provides that before a license may be
revoked or suspended for a period of more than 30 days a
public hearing shall be held.
These provisions in the statute, in question thus distinguish the instant case from the Camara, See, Vagabond
and Wheeler cases and bring it within the· principle of the
case of Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. 2d 648
(N. J., 1930). In that case the act involved gave authority
to the commission, in case of violation of the conditions of
the permit to manufacture beer, ale or wine, to hold a hearing and if the permittee has been guilty of violating any
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laws to revoke the permit. Such a hearing was pending
when the permittee brought an action to suppress all evidence obtained by an alleged illegal search and seizure in
either the penc~ing proceeding or any other proceeding. The
Court says:
In my opm10n, the complainant is not, under
the present proceedings now pending against it,
entitled to invoke the provisions of the Fourth and
Fifth Amendments, to interfere with the investigations being made by government officers for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the complainant is
entitled to confidence, and to continue to exercise
the right to manufacture its product under government permission. None of the cases which I have
been able to find extends the protection of these
amendments to cases of this character.
There the regulations of the Prohibition Department
gave the administrator and other officers authority to inspect the premises of the permit holder at any and all times
not inconsistent with the conduct of the business. The Court
points out that search warrants are not available in a civil
proceeding but are confined to cases of public prosecutions
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the
detection and punishment of criminals.
Under Sec. 16-6-13.7 and Sec. 16-6-13.11 the only proceedings that can be taken against a club that refuses entry
upon request is a hearing before the Liquor Control Commission to determine whether the license of the club should
be revoked or suspended for failure to adhere to this condition of the license. Inspections conducted to determine
whether grounds exist for revoking or suspending the license do not come within the Fourth Amendment.
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Engaging in the storage and consumption of
liquor is a privilege and requires the licensee to observe
the conditions imposed by law for the obtaining of the license and waives the right to demand a search warrant.
( c)

By applying for and obtaining the license the licensee
agrees to permit entry upon its premises as provided in
sub-section 7 quoted in appellants' brief. This, in effect,
waives his right to require a search warrant. The procurement of a license by a nonprofit corporation to permit its
members to store and drink liquor on its premises is not
a right but a privilege that may be granted or withheld by
the state. (See also Point IV (b), infra.) Section 16-613.1 ( 4) provides: " ( 4) The so-called 'locker system' for
the storage and serving of intoxicating liquors shall be
legal in this state only when operated by a nonprofit corporation m compliance with the terms and provisions of
this chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control
Act of 1969, and the regulations of the commission adopted
thereunder." The privilege thus granted is not, as counsel
states in his brief, "the privilege of organizing a social club
and maintaining rooms for that social club", but is the
privilege to store and consume liquor on the club's or corporation's premises. Without this privilege being granted,
there is no right granted to the corporation to permit the
storage and consumption of liquor on its premises by its
members.
As stated by Justice Ellett in his dissenting opinion in
State v. Salt Lake City, the Vagabond case:
If the establishment desires to have liquor
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consumed by its members and guests, it must comply with the law which grants the privilege. One
requirement is that peace officers have the right to
enter the clubrooms and meeting rooms for the purpose of determining whether any laws or ordinances
are being violated. The officer is not entering to
make a search. No search is contemplated by the
ordinance or by the statute. He simply enters to
see what everybody else in there sees; whether the
law is being violated."
He further states the See case is not in point, as we
have already demonstrated, and continues:
The case with which we are here concerned
does not involve a person who is accused of crime
for denying entrance by an inspector into private
property which he owns and has a right to own
without license or leave. Rather, we are here considering the question of whether one who seeks the
right to operate a club where liquor is to be consumed can enjoy that right without complying with
the statutory conditions precedent thereto.

It is not a matter of bargaining with the state, surrendering a constitutional right by the licensee in order
to secure a license. It is rather a consent to compliance by
the licensee with the state's requirements in order to obtain
a right to which it otherwise would not be entitled. The
club can organize as a nonprofit corporation, and choose its
members and carry on all the social or other activities
which such an organization desires. But it may not, without complying with the requirements of the law, engage
in the consumption and storage of liquor, for the state has
assumed complete jurisdiction over the traffic in liquor,
something it has unquestioned authority to do.
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This Court has held in Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart,
82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229 (1933), "There is no common
law right on the part of any person to sell intoxicating
liquor. The right to sell liquor is not one of the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States which the
states are forbidden to abridge." The Court quotes from
19 R. C. L. 14, " 'However partial it may seem, the state
can exercise a monopoly of any business that is inherently
dangerous to society and for that reason may lawfully be
prohibited by it on the grounds of public policy, without
violating any constitutional inhibitions, because no person
possesses an inherent right to engage in any employment,
the pursuit of which is necessarily detrimental to the public.' "
In Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board,
33 Wash. 2d 688, 206 P. 2d 1209, 9 A. L. R. 2d 531 (1949),
the Court said :
There is no natural or constitutional right to
sell liquor or engage in the business of selling or
dispensing intoxicating liquor. The state under its
police power may prohibit entirely the carrying on
of such business and may regulate it in such manner as may be deemed advisable. The times when,
the places where, and the persons to whom it may
be sold may be determined by the state. The privilege of dispensing intoxicating liquor may be given
to some and denied to others. In considering the
claims of discrimination and the distinction between a lawful business which a citizen has the
right to engage in and one in which he may engage
only as a matter of grace of the state must be constantly in mind. There is such a vast field of au-
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thority on the subject that we shall content ourselves with citing a few of the cases decided by
this court and leading cases decided by the United
States Supreme Court. Then follows several citations.
In Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 (1946), the
petitioner entered into contracts with the United States
to do certain work. The contract provided that petitioner's
accounts and records shall be open at all times to the government. In his absence the government representatives
examined his records and found a check for $4,000 which
should have been for $2,500. He sought to suppress this
check under the Fourth Amendment. The Court says :
But these rights (under the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments) may be waived. When petitioner, in
order to obtain the government's business, specifically agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and
records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy
which he otherwise might have had as respects business documents related to those contracts.
One of the conditions to which an applicant for a license to operate as a liquor locker club must agree is that
it consent to inspection by peace officers and others during
business hours to inspect the entire clubhouse, club quarters and all books and records of the licensee. The members
also agree to the inspection of their lockers. This, in effect,
is a waiver of the right to require a search warrant to make
an inspection. If the club desires a license as a liquor locker
club, it must give this consent. It isn't a matter of two
parties bargaining. The club is not entitled, as a matter of
right, to a license. The state has specified the conditions
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under which the privilege of operating a liquor locker club
will be granted, and, having accepted the privilege, the club
agrees to the terms under which the privilege is granted.
This is precisely the same situation as is involved in the
Zap case. There, too, the contractor had no alternative but
to consent to an inspection if he desired to do business with
the government.
In Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission,
200 A. 407, 89 N. H. 442 (1938), the statute provided that
any member of the commission may at any time enter any
place of business where liquor is sold or manufactured. The
Court says:
The contention that the regulation is invalid
on the ground that it violates the protection of the
federal and state constitutions from unreasonable
search, confuses between rights and privileges. No
one may sell intoxicating liquor against the state's
consent, and if consent is granted, it may be on such
terms and conditions as the state attaches thereto.
Acceptance of the license is an acceptance of the
requirements to be observed by the licensee. The
requirements impose the obligation to observe them,
since the obligation is one voluntarily assumed in
return for the privilege.
To the same effect, see State of N eiu Jersey v. Zurawski, 89 N. J. Super. 488, 215 A. 2d 564 (1964); Zukowski
v. State, 167 Md. 549, 175 A. 595; Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Com. Ed. v. ]lfrCulley, 877 P. 2d 568 (Okl., 1963);
Fischer v. State, 195 Mel. 477, 74 A. 2d 34 (1950).

Under licensing statutes covering a business regulated by law tlie right under the Fourth Amendment to
(d)
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a search warrant is waived by accepting the license.
In 79 C. J. S., Sec. 62, p. 819, is the following:
The constitutional immunity (searches and
seizures) is sometimes waived by a person when
he engages in a business which is regulated by law,
the acceptance of a license to engage in such business being a necessary acceptance of the statutory
conditions and an implied waiver of the constitutional immunity to that extent.
The following authorities are cited which support the
text:

Bowles v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835 ( 1946), in which the
Court says:
The immunities of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments are not absolute but are rather subject
to waiver and he who enters into, or continues in,
a business subject to official regulation voluntarily
submits his business records and papers to such
visitorial examination as the law contemplates, and
in that measure waives his constitutional immunities of privacy in respect of his papers and against
compulsory testimony.

State v. Hall, 164 Tenn. 548, 51 S. W. 2d 851 (1932).
The statute required as a condition to taking wild animals
and birds that the hunter permit the state game warden or
his deputy to inspect and count the animals, wild birds,
wild fowl and fish to ascertain whether the requirements
of the act were being faithfully complied with. The Court
says:
The constitution does not prohibit searches in
general, but only those that are unreasonable . . .
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No one has an absolute property right in game
or fish while in a state of nature, and the right to
take them may be restricted or prohibited, and,
when granted or exercised, it is a privilege.
This being true, we see no reason why the
state may not annex to this privilege any condition
and limitation it sees fit. If the sportsman is unwilling to avail himself of the privilege accorded
him, upon the terms and provisions prescribed, he
may decline the invitation, but he cannot enjoy the
benefits of this act without submitting to its burdens and restrictions.
The Court quotes with approval the above excerpt
from Corpus Juris and cites several cases from other jurisdictions in support of its position. One is Wibmer v.
State, 182 Wis. 303, 195 N. W. 936 (1923), in which it was
held that the acceptance of a license to sell nonintoxicating
liquors under statute is an acceptance of the statutory conditions as to inspection of the premises by police or prohibition officers of the premises upon which the nonintoxicating liquors are kept. Says the Court:
The acceptance of the license is necessarily an
acceptance of the accompanying statutory conditions and as to the premises is an implied waiver of
the search and seizure provisions of the constitution.
In Plainos v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. 367, 100 S. W. 2d 367
( 1936), the Court says:
In the absence of the power to make reasonable and proper inspections of the premises of the
licensee, the object and purpose of the Liquor Control Act would be emasculated ...

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
Appellant applied for and accepted his license
subject to the requirement that he submit to inspections of his licensed premises by the duly authorized agents of the Liquor Control Board. Hence,
appellant was in the attitude of consenting to the
search without the issuance of a search warrant.
To the same effect, see Plainos v. State, 132 Tex. Cr.
110, 102 S. vV. 2d 217 ( 1937); United States v. Cardiff, 95
F ..Supp. 206 (D. C., 1951); United States v. Rabicoff, 55
F. Supp. 88 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1944); State v. Putzke, 7
Ohio App. 2d 118, 218 N. E. 2d 627 (1966); Tucker v. State,
244 Md. 488, 224 A. 2d 111 (1966).
In 47 Am. Jur., p. 510, Sec. 13, is the following:
The use of a search warrant to prevent and
detect crime is a valid exercise of the police power
of the state. The constitutional provisions have no
application to reasonable rules and regulations
adopted in the exercise of the police power for the
protection of the public health, morals and welfare.
Therefore, the inspection of a place of business during business hours, in the enforcement of reasonable regulations in the exercise of the police power,
is not a violation of the guaranty against searches
and seizures.
In Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235
Ky. 265, 30 S. W. 2d 968 (1930), an ordinance was upheld
as constitutional which required junk dealers to consent
to inspection and search of premises as a prerequisite to
obtaining a license to engage in such business.
The case of State v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. W. 2d
601 (1930), involved a law regulating barber shops. The
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Court held the law was not violative of the constitutional
provision against unreasonable searches and seizures saying:
No search or seizure in a sense protected
against by the Constitution is provided for. Inspection of a place of business during business hours, in
the enforcement of reasonable regulations in the
exercise of the police power is not a violation of this
constitutional right. (Emphasis added.)
As to "licensing programs", we repeat what the Court
said in the Colonnade case: "In See, we reserved decisions
on the problems of 'licensing programs' requiring inspections saying they can be resolved on a case by case basis
under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness", clearly indicating the rule announced in the See
case did not apply to situations involving licensing.
We respectfully submit that it is apparent the decision
of the majority in the Vagabond and Wheeler cases did not
fully consider the legal propositions to which we have referred and which must be considered in properly disposing
of the instant case. The Camara and See cases, upon which
the majority relied as dispositive of the Vagabond and
Wheeler cases, are not in point.
To permit an inspection of the premises only by a
warrant based on probable cause to believe that the law has
been violated would completely frustrate what appears to
be the main purpose of the law, to prevent illegal activity
in the first place. Private locker clubs must allow law enforcement officers to be present whenever the club is open
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for the transaction of business to prevent violations of the
liquor laws from occurring since such violations would
clearly be much less likely to occur when an officer is
present.
The Fourth Amendment is not violated by the statute
in question as is abundantly shown by the authorities we
have cited.
POINT III.
§§ 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5, UTAH CODE ANN.
(1969), RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENT
OF LOCAL CONSENT TO SELL OR DISPENSE
INTOXICATING LIQUORS ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.

Local pol-ice regulation matters are properly left
to the localities.
(a)

Appellant argues that the "local consent" requirements
in Sections 16-6-13.1 ( 6), 13.5, Utah Code Annotated ( 1969),
violate Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24, which requires that " . . . all laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation." Appellants claim that there is a violation of Article I, Sec. 24 because there can be de facto prohibition in any city or county of the state that does not give
consent for the licensing of private nonprofit liquor clubs.
(See Point II of appellant's brief.)
This Court heard and rejected a similar claim in
State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 Pacific 261 (1915).
Briggs was convicted for making an unlawful sale of in-
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toxicating liquor. One of the bases for the appeal was that
the statute under which Briggs had been convicted was
unconstitutional because the local option provision violated
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 24. The Court in Briggs
found no violation of Article I, Sec. 24. In doing so it relied
primarily on Peterson v. Petterson, 42 Utah 271, 30 Pac.
231 ( 1913). The Court in Peterson found that Sec. 20,
Compiled Laws of Utah (1907) was not in violation of the
constitutional requirement that "all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform application."

There is a strong presumption that local officials
will exercise their discretion within constitutional bounds.
(b)

In considering the validity of the act it must also be
kept in mind that there is a strong presumption in favor
of the constitutionality of statutes and in favor of the constitutionality of the enforcement. This Court has repeatedly held that enactments of the constituted legislative
authority are presumed to be valid and constitutional. This
presumption will prevail in the absence of a strong showing
of constitutional infirmity. See State v. Briggs, (supra).
Appellants urge that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional because no standards are prescribed for the
granting of local consent. In the language of the appellants,
clubs are left "at the mercy of the local authority's whimsical discretion." (Brief of Appellants, p. 15.) It is further
stated that: "The existence of such a vague requirement
precludes due process of law and permits discriminatory
and unequal treatment of those similarly situated." Id.
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In so arguing, appellants ignore the clear rules of construction that presumes that officials administering an act
will proceed in a manner which will not be unconstitutional
and that statutes, when differing interpretations are possible, should be given the interpretation that will uphold
constitutionality. There is nothing in the statute which
"precludes" due process of law. Indeed, the presumption
is that the local authority will act in a constitutional manner by guaranteeing due process and equal protection when
deciding to grant, deny, or revoke local consent. (See, e.g.,
Lieberman V. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905) and
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 (1870) .)
The fact that the delegation of authority to grant or
deny local consent was not accompanied by substantive and
procedural standards is irrelevant to the inquiry. The presumption of procedural fairness has been noted and this
is the only alleged defect.
Each city and county should have some control over
the location of locker clubs within its jurisdiction. The
numerous areas of local concern are the location of clubs
with respect to zoning laws and schools, churches, parks,
other clubs, residential areas, etc., compliance with local
health and sanitation codes, and compliance with fire regulations. The local authority is likely to have the most accurate and recent records of arrests and misconduct of the
persons applying for consent. Inasmuch as the needs and
circumstances vary from one community to the next, it
would be virtually impossible for the legislature to adopt
standards for each locality within the state.
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The Utah Supreme Court as early as 1891 ruled on
the standards presumed with a delegation of authority.
In Perry v. Oity Council of Salt Lake City, 7 Utah
143, 25 P. 739. This court considered an application for mandamus by one who was denied a liquor license by the city council. After discussing the various
community interests concerning the location of liquor establishments, the court discussed the nature of the delegation to the city council.
"The charter confers the power to regulate the
traffic upon the city, without expressly requiring
it to be exercised by ordinance. But it is said that
the councilmen may act from mere whims, caprice,
partiality, or prejudice unless the regulation is by
ordinance. The court should assume that public
officers will act from proper motives until the contrary appears. It is also claimed that the court
must presume that the council acted arbitrarily or
without sufficient reason in refusing the license, because no reason appears upon its record. The court
will not assume that the council refused the license
arbitrarily, and without suffic-ient reason, without
some proof. Being public officers, and acting under
the sanction of an oath, the court will assume that
they acted laiofully until the contrary appears. (25
P. at 741, emphasis added.)
The doctrine of presumption of legal and constitutional
conduct in the absence of absolutely definitive standards
was more recently enunciated by the California Supreme
Court in In Re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P. 2d 24
( 1958). Petersen was arrested for violating the police code
of the city of San Francisco by parking his taxicab in a
taxi zone reserved for another cab company. In his petition
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for habeas corpus, Petersen alleged that the statute which
allows for exclusive stands at the discretion of the chief of
police and the adjacent property owner is unconstitutional.
Specifically, it was urged that:
"(3) The provision which grants the chief of
police discretion to designate exclusive stands fails
to prescribe any standards to guide him in that respect." 331 P. 2d at 27.
There were no express standards for the chief of police
to follow in designating taxicab stands. The court discussed
the presumption and requirements when express standards
are not provided.
"The absence of express standards in such situations does not mean that the licensing agency
may act arbitrarily or oppressively; it is presumed
that the agency will duly perform its public duty,
but an abuse may be shown and relief obtained in
the courts ...
"Moreover, standards for administrative action
can sometimes be found by implication. In Rescue
Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 471, 171
P. 2d 8, where an ordinance requiring a permit was
involved, we held that sufficient standards were inherent in the reasons which must have led to the
adoption of the ordinance." (331 P. 2d at 29.)
Appellant contends that the "local authorities have interpreted §§ 16-6-13.1 and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann.
( 1969), to mean that they may whimsically revoke their
consent, as well as grant it, and the liquor control commission considers any revocation of local consent conclusive
grounds for license revocation." (Appellants' brief, Point
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III, p. 26.) There is not even an allegation, aside from a
total lack of evidence that any party to this action has
had any license revoked by reason of the local consent
being revoked. Furthermore, there is nothing in the
applicable statutes which gives local authorities the power
to revoke consent once given. Also, there is no proof
of any such position being taken by the Liquor Commission
and their counsel is advised by them that no such position
has ever been taken by them. This points up the importance
and wisdom of the legal principles involving standing set
forth under Point I above. This Court should refuse to
base its decision on a hypothetical set of facts. To do otherwise is to invite needless challenges to every legislative
enactment to avoid fanciful injuries which are highly speculative at best.
In the present case it is clear that there are implied
standards for the granting and denial of local consent.
Whether expressly stated in the delegating statute or not,
the requirements of fairness and equal treatment are impliedly placed on actions by the local authority. In the absence of any allegation and proof of violation of these standards, appellants' case must fail.
POINT IV.
§§ 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5 UTAH CODE ANN.
(1969), IN PROVIDING FOR NO HEARINGS
DO NOT DENY DUE PROCESS SINCE IN
UTAH A LIQUOR LICENSE IS ONLY A PRIVILEGE REGULATED UNDER THE POLICE
POWER AND NOT "PROPERTY" WITHIN

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE MEANING
CLAUSE.

OF

THE

DUE

PROCESS

Appellants contend that the provisions in §§ 16-6-13.1
and 16-6-13.5 violate due process because no hearings are
provided for in granting, denying, suspending or revoking
local consent or in granting or denying a license by the
Utah State Liquor Control Commission. In support of that
contention, however, they refer to cases which are inapplicable to the present controversy. Hannah v. Larche, 363
U. S. 420 (1960), held that hearings were not necessary
in determinations by the Commission on Civil Rights because it was only a fact finding body. Jenkins v. McKeithen,
395 U. S. 411 ( 1969), decided that hearings were necessary
when the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission publicly branded individuals as guilty of criminal violations.
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 U. 2d 167, 321 P.
2d 644 (1958), involved the revocation of a certificate of
convenience and necessity to operate a common carrier.
Neither the factuaJ situations of these cases nor the
rules stated therein are analogous to the situation presented
here involving liquor licenses, which have always been
strictly regulated under the state's police power because of
the potential danger to public health, safety and morals involved in the sale of intoxicating liquors.

Due process does not mandate hearings under
all circumstances.
(a)

In Spurbeck v. Statton, 252 Iowa 279, 106 N. W. 2d
660 (1960), a case involving revocation of a drivers' license,
the court said :
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The second major challenge to the validity of
the act is that it provides for a denial of due process
of law, because the license is suspended without
notice or hearing. The exercise of the authority
provided for must be sustained, if at all, as an exercise of the police power of the state. In SteinbergBaum & Co. v. Countryman, supra, page 931 of 247
Iowa, page 19 of 77 N. W. 2d, we said: "The United
States Supreme Court has frequently pointed out
'the police power is not subject to any definite limitations, but is co-extensive with the necessities of
the case and the safeguards of the public interest.' "
. . . The concept of due process of law does not
necessarily and under all circumstances require notice and hearing before official action -is taken.
Wall v. King, 1 Cir., 206 F. 2d 878, 883; Yakus v.
U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 442, 64 S. Ct. 660, 676, 88 L.
Ed. 834. (Emphasis added.)
There remains to consider the contention that the beer
licenses are property and cannot be taken away from the
licensee without notice and hearing. With this contention
we cannot agree. Clearly the original Constitution did not
deprive the states of their police power, which they might
exercise for the protection of the public health, welfare, and
morals. Bartemeyer v. State of Iowa, 85 U. S. 129, 18 Wall.
129, 21 L. Ed. 929. The sale of nonintoxicating beer may
be regulated by the state under its police power. No restraints were imposed upon the police power by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mugler v. State of
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205. Consequently, ·when the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, the
constitutional law, except as to importations of liquor into
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a state in violations of its laws, reverted to its condition
prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. The
police power of the states was unimpaired. Under that
power, these licenses could be revoked.
In 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, Rev. 2d Ed.,
Section 1108, p. 714, the distinguished author said:

* * * A license to carry on a business
which affects health, safety, morals or the public
welfare may be revoked by virtue of the police
power. * * *
Before revocation, in the absence of statutory
or charter requirement, there is no necessity for
notice or an opportunity to be heard, since the revocation of a license is an administrative act.
(Abeln v. City of Shakopee, 224 Minn. 262, 28 N.
w. 2d 642 (1947) .)
In Utah it is definitely established that the regulation of
liquor is an exercise of the police power and the reasonableness of the legislation is for the Legislature, not the courts,
to determine.
·when legislative action is within the scope of
the police power, fairly debatable questions as to
the reasonableness, wisdom, or propriety are not
for the courts but for the Legislature. Standard Oil
Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73
L. Ed. 856 . . . That the prohibition or regulation
of the manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise
of the police power of the state admits of no doubt.
(Utah Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198,
23 P. 2d 229 (1933) .)
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See, also, Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46, 91 Id.
99 (1966); Payson St. Neighborhood Club v. Board of
Liquor Licenses Com'r. for Baltimore City, 103 A. 2d 847,
204 Md. 278 (1954).

A liquor license is only a "privilege" a·nd not a
"right" within the meaning of the due process clause and
hence hearings are not required.
(b)

Among those activities regulated under the police
power, the sale of liquor is unique and the courts have allowed in this area even greater latitude with regard to
traditional due process requirements because of its inherent danger to society. Most states declare that a license to sell liquor is a privilege granted by the states
and not "property" within the meaning of the due process
clause. (See also Point II ( c), supra.) In Utah, the license
to sell liquor has always been regarded as a privilege. In
Utah Mfrs'. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d
229 (1933), this court said, in rejecting the contention
that the liquor laws created an unconstitutional monopoly.
It is equally well established that the sale of
intoxicating liquors is peculiarly, on account of the
evil effects resulting from their use, subject to legislative control and regulation ... As we have before seen, the contract or property right of no citizen is affected by such measure . . . [W]hen the
state bestows a privilege which is not a common,
natural right, such as the right to engage in the
liquor traffic, it may create a monopoly, and yet
no right of the individual be violated. (Id., 82 U.
198, 208.)
In the case of Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 U. 2d 67, 305 P. 2d
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870 ( 1957), this court rejected the contention that the
liquor law impaired the obligations of contract with similar
"privilege" language, declaring:
"They indeed have the same constitutional
rights of property and contract as all other citizens,
but they have no constitutional right to store and
serve liquor on their premises. If they desire to
continue to enjoy this privilege, they must so conduct their affairs as to comply with the legal regulations pertaining thereto."
In Yarbrough v. Montoya, 54 N. M. 91, 214 P. 2d 769
(1950), the court upheld a denial of a liquor license by an
administrative agency even though no formal hearing was
had. Citing from an earlier case, the court said:
Such license is a pr?'.vilege and not property
'Within the rneaning of the rl,ue process and contract
clauses of the constitutions of the State and the
nation, and in them licensees have no vested property rights. (Id., 214 P. 2d 769, 771.)
A recent federal case from the 6th Circuit is in point. In
Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 356 F. 2d 276 (6th Cir.
1966), the court held :
We hold only that neither the Fifth nor Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required that the Grand Rapids City Commission hold a full "due process" hearing to consider
plaintiff Lewis' request for the transfer to him of
a license then owned by another.

* * *

Michigan's view that the character of the liquor
business permits greater latitude in the means of
its regulation than in the controls applied to other
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activities was paralleled by the United States Supreme Court in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S.
86, 11 S. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620 ( 1890) . The court
there said,
"There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus
sell intoxicating liquors by retail . "

* * *
The only inescapable rule of Crowley is that
the denial of a hearing, in itself, would not violate
the Fourteenth Amendment ...
Indeed the District Judge here recognized the
rules we speak of when he said,
"We recognize the Michigan Supreme Court
and the courts of other states have held consistently
that the due process clause of the United States Constitution does not apply to matters concerning liquor
licenses." 222 F. Supp. 384. Such observation conforms to the great weight of authority. Anno. 35
A. L. R. 2d 1067. (Id., pp. 285, 286.)
Other cases that stand for the proposition that liquor
licenses do not merit "property" status under the due process clause include Kopper Kettle Restaurant, Inc. v. City
of St. Robert, 439 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1969); Barlotta v. Jefferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1968); In
re Tahiti Bar, Inc., 186 Pa. Super. 214, 142 A. 2d 491
(1958); Mumford v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control,
65 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. App. 1968); Hornstein v. Illinois
Liquor Control Comm., 412 Ill. 365, 106 N. E. 2d 354
(1952); Turner v. Miami, 160 Fla. 317, 34 So. 2d 551
(1948); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 13 F. Supp. 90 (D. C. Cal. 1935); Kaname Takaii v.
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State Bd. of Equalization, 20 Cal. App. 2d 612, 67 P. 2d
1082 (1937): Darby v. Pence, 17 Id. 697, 107 P. 484 (1910);
Oval Bar & Restaurant, Inc. v. Bruckman, 177 Misc. 244,
30 N. Y. S. 2d 394 (1941). Barlotta, Kopper Kettle, Tahiti
Bar, Hornstein, Darby, Oval Bar, supra, dealt specifically
with the lack of hearing provisions.
In light of the above authorities, appellants' contention
that "procedural safeguards are just as important to this
property right [liquor license] as they are in the type of
property right involved in Morris," is untenable. (Appellants' brief, Point III, p. 25.) The authorities consistently
distinguish between the manufacture, storage and sale of
liquor and other businesses. Kent Club v. Toronto, supra;
Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, supra. Even the fact that
a hearing is provided in one instance does not evidence a
legislative recognition of a property right. The court in
Lewis, supra, for example, noted that a hearing was required for revoking but not for the initial granting or denying of a license. Certainly no property right was recognized by the court there. In such a situation involving
liquor, the providing for a hearing is "merely a matter of
courtesy," Usdane v. Bruckman, (Sup.) 30 N. Y. S. 2d 396
(1941).
Accordingly, the receiving or maintaining a license to
sell liquor is not a property right within the meaning of the
due process clause. It is merely a privilege granted by the
state pursuant to its police power. The potential dangers to
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the public health, safety and morals inherent in the sale and
consumption of liquor and the necessities of the situation
justify the procedures here enacted by the Legislature for
the protection of the people of Utah. The sections in question do not violate due process.

CONCLUSION
The appellants have no standing before the Court to
challenge the statutes in question, because their rights have
not been impaired nor threatened. The federal rights of
appellants under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable
through the Fourteenth Amendment, have not been
abridged because their acceptance of a license under the
liquor statutes constitutes a waiver of their right to insist
upon a search warrant. Further, the nature of the search
provided is reasonable under the police power of the state
to regulate liquor distribution and consumption; and the
sanctions imposed for refusing entry are not criminal, but
civil in nature. The requirement of local consent properly
leaves such matters to local officials whose acts are presumed to be reasonably exercised within constitutional limits. Appellants have failed to allege or prove that their
rights have in any way been violated or threatened.
The absence of hearing procedures does not violate constitutional due process standards because a liquor license
granted by the state affords only a privilege and not a
property right within the meaning of the due process clause.
Each challenged statute is severable from the other in any
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event and if any are found invalid, that would not require
the entire Act to be declared invalid.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General of Utah
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Deputy Attorney General
HOMER HOLMGREN
Assistant Attorney General
THOMAS C. ANDERSON
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

Attorneys for
Defendants-Respondents
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